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INSIGHTS INTO THE PROCESS OF

CONVERGING INTER-AGENCY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
Roberta Banaszak Gleiter
The Aerospa« Corporation, Los Angeles, CA
Captain Lee Rosen
Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, CA
Tht opi11ions ud condusions in this paptr • ..., lbOH of th• autbon nd lrt •Ol lntndtd lo .-.,prrstnl tht
offid1I position oflhr DoD, USAF, Tht Atrosp1ct Corpor11ion or uy othtr l0¥trnmul 11ucy.

With the dccrcascd funding available for government programs, many agencies hne converged or an: contemplating converging
theirfunctionsandpcrsonnclinordertobccostcffcctiveandmllll:cfficientintheirproccsscs
This study provides an overview of the organizational theory related to convergence pllX:css and the issues and impacts of
creating joint programs from independent, long standing military and civil programs. The management aspects of the convergence
pllX:CSS, with an emphasis on human and organizational issues, an: presented and lessons learned highlighted.
The methodology used to conduct this study included an extensive literature search and survey. The survey was completed by
individuals at diffCTCnt levels of management selected from six converged and converging government programs.
The results of the study revealed a strong tendency for converged government programs to violate basic organizational theory
principlesduringtheirconvergcnceexpericnces. Survey results showed individualsinthescconvergedorganizationsgenerally had
lowerthanaveragemorale,werephysicallyseparatedfromkeypansoftheorganization,faccdscriousbureaucraticroadblocks,and
fcltthattherewasalackofcommunicationwithintheirorganizations.
Finally,suggestionsforconductingsuccessfulconverged programsan:out!inedincluding:establishagreementonmissionneed
and requirements as soon as possible; establish cleaJ chain of command; provide honest, direct and frequent communications;
establish equitable management and procedures; aniculate a vision; and endeavor to bring all levels of workers together within a
common set of goals.
·

QJlJEcrlYE
The purpose of this study was to chart unexplored
areas of organizational behavior relevant to current
government program consolidation and to provide
insight into the human side of converging government
programs.
The nation's tightening economic and fiscal re·
alities have created an environment in which the gov·
emment is being forced to cut more and do more with
less. Initiatives such as Vice President Gore's National
Performance Review have identified ways in which
government activities and programs may be re·vamped
to save money. The terms "downsizing," "right·sizing,"
and "streamlining" are becoming standard vocabulary
for all government employees.
As members of a Team associated with a con·
verging program, the authors hoped to gain insight into
the often overlooked organiz.ational aspects of bringing
together dichotomous inter.agency organiz.ations. It is
hoped that insight and lessons learned discovered in this
research will be used to insurethefuturesuccessofthat
program and other converging programs.
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The tenn convergence as defined by Webster's
New World Dictionary is: "the act, fact, or condition of
converging; to move or be directed toward the same
place,purposeorresult."(Rcf. l)

It is ironic that organiz.ations who attempt to
"converge," "merge," "acquire," "integrate," or
"consolidate" seldom achieve their originally intended
purpose or result. According to a decade·long study of
ten mergers by Arthur Lewis, 80"/o failed to live up to
projections made for them in the feasibi lity studies.
(Rd.2)

For the purposes of this study, the tenns quoted
above are used synonymously. Converged organiz.ations
are those brought together from previously different
sources, now working toward a common goal.

snmy METHOOO! ooy
The study methodology includes the folJowing
sevenphases:(l)literaturesearch;(2)surveydevelop-ment; (3) survey panelists selection; (4) survey data ac·
cumulation; (5) data analysis; (6) conclusions based on
findings and literature search; (7) recommendations
based on study conclusions.

I !TERATIIRE SEARCH
The first phase of the study was to gather data on
converged/converging inter·agency programs from
published literature. Due to the newness of the conver·
gence activity in government the breadth and depth of
available of data sources are limited. However, the
literature is quite com plete in the area of commercial
mergers.

Ocganjzatjonal Theory
The intent of the managers of most converging
organizations is to magically make "I+ I '* 3," hoping
for a synergistic effect when two organizations combine
talents, resources, and other strong-points for a more
productive, efficient union. It seems logical, and often
appears that "on paper~ this newly converged organization would be stronger than its parts. However, it is
generally agreed that a merger will not produce that
elusive "synergy" sought by companies unless the issues
involving people arc addressed. (Ref. 3)
Financial, technological, and strategic considerations are typically identified by top managers when a
merger is being considered. These objective, tangible
measures produce a type of~organizational bonom-linc~
on which managers make their decision, and judge the
results of the convergence. However, even when the bottom line looks favorable, mergers often fail. Problems
with people are one reason why one-half to two--thirds of
convergence efforts fail. (Ref. 3) The answer appears not
to be with the bonom line, but at the front line with
people.
The literature suggests that there has been a revival of interest in the role of human factors in determining the outcome of convergence. In a survey of more
than 200 European chief executive officers, Booz, Allen
& Hamilton Inc. found that the, "ability to integrate the
new company'' was ranked as the top factor in dctermining thesucccssofthemerger.(Rcf.4)
The role of people, erroneously labeled the
"soft" or "mushier'' issue, tends to be ignored
or overlooked, perhaps not surprisingly, given
thatthehumanresourcefunctionisoftenseen
as marginal to the organization and is rarely
involved in target selection or merger
planning."(Ref. 5)
Several algorithms exist for analyzing the financial compatibility of organizations, but the .question of
assessing the human factors involved remains elusive.
Mirvis and Marks suggest that along with th e quantitative assessments, managers must appraise "organization"
and"cultural"fit. Organizational fit requires managers
to weigh the following factors when considering
convergence: (I) Compare the compatibility of
structures, system, people, (2) Define key synergism,
factors that "make it work," and (3) Develop scenarios
based on different degrees of integration (i.e. total absorption, common functions). Cultural fit requires an
assessment of: ( 1) Philosophy, methods, style, values,
(2) Benefits versus Risks - compare integration models
with potential costs such as resistance, turnover, problems, and (3) Make time an asset by using pre-convergence period to test fit under different integration scenarios. (Ref. 6)
Once the organizational and cultural fit of the
converging organizations has been determined, and a
decision to merge the organization has been made,

...

managers of newly converged organizations must deal
with the largest stress factor on people, which is change.
Managers Of organizations embarking on a significant change event, such as a merger, must realize
that their people will, according to training expert John
lacovini, find themselves floundering in a sea of stress
and confusion. "They look around for something to hold
on to. They crave security, respect, and empathy even
whilethebusinessofanorganizationalchangerusheson
aroundthem."(Ref.7)
As this organizational change occurs, the newly
converged team may experience an "organizational
sickness." Marks and Mirvis found some of the symptoms of this risky disease to be: turnover of key people,
people refusing reassignment, relocation costs/
downtime, post merger performance drops, lost
customcrs.lcapacity/synergism and finally morale problems. (Ref. 6) Organizations as a whole may experience
some, or all of these symptoms, but for individuals in
the organization, the consequences of the sickness may
be grave.
For individuals, a merger is analogous to the
death of a loved one. Mourners go through phases of
immediate disbelief and loss, they then often have
trouble getting their lives back in gear, and finally they
realize that life must go on. Iacovini suggests that
merging organizations pass through similar phases on
the road to convergence. First, individuals feel a collective loss for their former organization. They must let go
of their old paradigm and deal with a new set of ru les
that has not yet been well defined. Feelings of sadness,
anger, denial, and fear are common during this phase.
To leave this stage they must be provided with things
like visible support, stability, opportunities to interact
informally and a constant flow of information. They
then move to the next phase known as the impasse
where they may become entrenched in their old way of
doing business, longing for the past. Successful organizations take time to reflect on where things stand, encourage creative thinking and tolerate diversity and encourage people to reminisce about the past and think of
ways to improve in the future. Finally, organizations that
successfully navigate through the first two stages will
reach the renewal stage characterized by new challenges
and continuous improvement. (Ref. 7)
Post-merger stress can start the newly combined
organization on the road to disaster. In a case study ofa
large optical product company, Marks and Mirvis observed stressful feelings and rumor mongering, breakdown in communications and an "us versus them"
mentality ran rampant. Conflicts over who should lead,
stereotyping, and generally ill feelings dominated the
environment (Ref. 8). To mitigate these stresses employ·
ers must provide three basic needs: (I) Psychological
enlistment to make people feel wanted and have an
emotional stake in the mission of the team, (2) Role dC·
velopment to get people excited about their new jobs
and about the team's potential, and (3) Trust and confi-

dcncc development in people's colleagues and supervisors. (Ref. 8) Once these needs are provided for, managcmcn1 can begin the quest or reaching the new heights
they had hoped to obtain when they first contemplated
convergence.
In conclusion, we find through an extensive
searchorthcorganizationalthcory literature that human
ractors may he a major conuibutor to the success or
railurc or converging organizations. Top level leaders
and managers must consider the organizational bonom
line as well as the financial bonom line. Literature
documents that, even before convergence occurs, man-

agement must assess the organizational and cultural fit
or the organizations. Once compatibility has been dctennincd, they then must be prepared to deal with the
newly generated stress, confusion, controversy and
problems or organizational sickness that organizations,
and individuals within those organizations will be experiencing as they pass through the phases or letting go
of the old paradigm, gening stuck in the impasse, and
finally renewing their commitment. To counter these
difficulties,peoplc'snccdsforsccurity,respect,andempathy must be met. Personnel must be psychologically
cnlistcdintothcncworganization.

=
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The second phase or the study was to develop a
survey in order to gather the necessary data from
"experts." Experts arc defined as those individuals with
current first-hand experience in a converged/converging
in1e.r-agency government program.
In order to idenlify cri1ical sub-areas of the convergence process the authors interviewed participants
(experts/management) in the converged organizations
believed to have a comprehensive first-hand knowledge
of convergence. The following key areas evolved:
funding, political sensitivity, top-level government support, bureaucratic roadblocks, level of program success,
level of top-down management, and organization morale. These areas were incorporated in the survey.
A broad-based survey, based on the above listed
key areas, was developed that contains a series or simple
closed-end questions utilizing Likert scales, measuring
anitudes,(Ref.9)as well as open-ended questions asking
the respondents to identify and define what they
considered to he the critical elements and issues of the
government multi-agency convergence process.
The respondents were asked to indicate their
degree of agreement, based on ten point Likert scales,
with the following eight simple closed-end questions:
Categorize the level of success of the converged
program that you work(ed) on.
2. Describe yoor program's funding profile. (Mark all that
apply).
3. Characterize the converged organization's morale
4. Describe the programs political sensitivity.
5. Describe the bureaucratic roadblocks experienced.
6 Describe the level of top-down direction received.
7. Characterize the lead agency support fO< your
program.
8. Characterize the physical location of involved
individuals/groups.
The intent of the following two open-ended
questions was to encourage the respondents to provide
open, detailed opinions on the relevant subject.
1.

....

If you were in charge of a converged program, what
would yoo do lo ensure its sUoCCeas?
Based on your experience, what advice would you
give to a program that is being considered for
convergence?

~

Forthissurvey,25 expertswcrcsclec1cd in three
primary ways. More than half of the respondents were
known to the authors through a currenlly converging
program. A smaller portion of the respondents were selected for their current involvement in diverse, mature
converged programs. Finally, some of the respondents
were located through infonnal channels such as preliminary research phone calls and referrals by other respondents.
The panelists represent three levels of organizational authority. The majority (sixteen) of the panelists
are in middle management, top level managcmcn1 is
represen1cd by two panelists, and seven workers arc included in the panel. This predctcnnincd sample represents the current spectrum of inter-agency government
convergence efforts.
Suryey Response Rate

or the 25 surveys scn1 to panelists in converged/converging programs, 25 responses were received. This unusual result of a I OOo/t return rate may be
unprecedented. Anything over SO"!. return rate for a
ques1ionnaire is considered acceptable. The high response rate can be attributed to many factors, one of
which could he a high level of interest in the subject
area of convergence and its resultant success or failure.
Another contributing factor to the response rate could be
the desire to contribute to the understanding of a
relatively undocumented and poorly undcrs1ood subject
The respondents have the common attribute of
current involvement in a converging/converged program
and possibly have justified human factors concerns
about job security. Research has shown that human
factors aspcctsof"mergers" arc similar to those present
in the program-convergence process.

_,,__

Figure I Kruskal-Wallis Test Results

The survey data are ordinal·scalcd and cannot be
analyzed by the usual analysis of variance procedures.
The data were analyzed instead for significance based
on the sample population of three layers of management.
The method of significance-analysis selected is the
Kruskal-Wallis Test. (Ref. l l) This non-parametric test of
significance is a one-way analysis of variance by ranks
and requires only ordinal-level data. The null hypothesis
assumed is: Management level does not affect

Worker
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responses.
Figure I shows the scores, ranks and sum of
ranks for the test scores. Those da{8. were incorporated
into the test statistic used for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W)
tcstwith1hcrcsultantscorc(Ho)of3.956.
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It is known that the distribution of the Kruska\-Wallis
test statistic is very close to the chi-square distribution.
With a conservative level of risk (0.10), the maximum
test statistic is 4.606. The comparison shows that the
survey data score fits within the chi-square distribu1ion;
thus, the null hypothesis is correct. The responses from
management are assumed therefore to be significant data
and not biased.

l'llill.lllilS
Having determined the significance of all data,
the information from management as well as workers
was used to determine the following seven findings.

Respondents provided seventy-three comments on the
survey, some of which are included in the discussion for
each finding.

Finding l:The respondents were uncertain about
the level of success of their program.
By a factor of two to one, uncertainty about level of
program success prevailed. The large number of panelists
who are currently working in a transitioning convergence
program may have driven this finding. However, the state
of the convergence program does not make this finding
any less valid because uncertainty is one of the human
resource problems considered pervasive in the
merger/convergence process. It is well documented that
people strongly identify their personal success with the
success level of their programs or organizations.

5-11

Uncertainty in program success directly relates to
personal insecurity. As documented by Bastien, this
insecurity is no1 confined to executives and top managers,
but pervades all organizational levels sampled.
Uncertainty in terms of job (and income) security was not
as common as the fear of diminished power, control, or
influence (closely related to dead-end syndrome
described by Kanter). (Ref. 12) Uncertainty in terms of job
and income security may not have occurred due to the
predominately military/civil service survey respondent
population, who typica lly are not concerned with these
issues.

Level of Program SucceH
verged program. fears of personal rejection as well as
jobinsecurityarcdefinitedriversoflowmorale.
The individual and social processes of coping with
this uncertainty involve sudden swi,ches between
opposites (fight- flight, 1;ommitment-rejeaion) rather
than gradual change from one state to another. The
aspect of personal uncertainty expressed as fear of the

"E
"
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unknown alternates with expressions of resentment at the

'2

forced intrusion of convergence, shows the fight-flight
reaction noted by Marks and Mirvis. (Rd. 13) The
personal reactions to uncertainty are major contributing

'~i~fJ

factors 10 the success
efforts.(Rer. 14)

Respondents commented about the lack of pennanenl
manning commitments by management early in the con-

or failure of mergers/convergence

Additional respondents' comments included: "deconverge; don't do it; jus1 say no" and "Don't converge,
create a new agency."

Finding 2:The morale of the organizations was
considered to be in -need of improvement.

Morale of Organization

"'

The vast majority of the respondents felt tha1 the
morale of their organization was less than OK. This
finding correlates well with the uncertainty aboul level
of program success. The above comments on uncertainty apply equally to low morale issues.
Respondents commen1ed about the lack of stTOng
leadership during the organization's infancy. Military
personnel, given their culiure and structure, thrive
under able leadership and Jack effec1iveness in its
absence. Morale is defini1ely affected. The Defense
Systems Managemenl College (DSMC) is clear in their
recommendation to provide strong and flexible
leadership in conjunction with managing joint
programs. (Ref. IS)"One of the major challenges for a
joinJ program manager Is to develop an npriJ de
corps willlln the program office," according to the
DSMC. (Ref. IS) However, they also note that joint program offices require more personnel than typical
single-service programs due lo the greater need for
coordination and interfaces with the various porticipaling services. Unfortunately, respondents' comments
also noted understaffing exacerbated by personnel
night and other types of rum-over.
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Additional respondents' comments included:
"Staffing and facilities should be a firs1 priority;"
"Motivate and provide enough freedom for people to
be creative;" and "Team building and cultural accli·
ma1ionprocessesarecrucial."

....

Finding 3:Tbe converged organizations were perceived as permeated with bureaucratic
roadblocks and characterized as almost total bottlenec:ks and constricted.

Bureaucratic Roadblocks

12~

10

•

Bureaucratic roadblocks were characterized as
"almost total bottlenecks" and "constricted" by almost
90% of the respondents. The agencies were perceived
ashaving"separateagendas"and"dividedloyalties."
DSMC Lessons Learned included the following
four statements:
Personnel participating in joint programs have
divided loyalties - to the joint program and to
their service affiliations.
Differences in which the Services view the joint
program, such as involvement or priority, can
impact the joint program (separate agendas).
Obtaining a joint agreement on the mission need
and doctrinal requirements is one of the most
difficult tasks in a joint program effort.

6
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Agreement by the Servicesonthepriorityoftheir
listed requirements is one of the most difficult to
achieve. (Ref. IS)
Several respondents commented that "politics is in
the driver's seat."

Finding 4:The direction provided by the topmost levels of management for the
converged organizations was not
considered to be at an ideal level. The
absence of direction was predominant.
Almost half of all respondents found that they had
" hardly any" top-level direction while approximately
one-third cited an ideal level. Comments included;
"establish clear authority of top management at the
beginning," "minimize top management," and
"establish program's hierarchy first, then .define the
system."
Low morale is reflected in one respondent's
statement that "any" direction would be better than
none. A perception of strong leadership that has a
focus on team-building is critical for a successful joint
program.
Findings I, 2, 3, and 4 appear to be linked. Lack of
direction and poor communication contribute to
uncertainty about a program's level of success.
The level of communicating and "forcing perceptions and misperceptions to the surface at the earliest
opportunity in order to bring about collaborative
problem-solving will determine the relative success of
the union both from a human resources and uhimately, financial standpoint," according to Arnold.

Amount of Top-level Direction

start-up organiz.ation can be devastating. Clear, welldefined reporting relationships and lines of authority
should be established as soon as possible. Historically,
the most unsuccessful mergers have suffered from
unclear relationships. They also have a tendency to
overcorrect the problem and change already vague,
poorly defined reporting relationships several times
duringthefirstyear.(Rcf.17)

(Rcf. 16)

The literature has total agreement that lack of direction for an organization with strong infrastructure
will eventually produce failure. But the effects on a

S-13

Finding 5:Program funding was adequately
funded in approximately half the cases
and under funded or with a recoverable shortfall in the rest.
Approximately 40% of respondents cited that their
programs were on-target with their funding profile with
about 25% reporting an under-funded status.
The program funding docs not appear to correlate
with the other findings of this study. Although underfunding could be considered a strcssor, given the currenl budgetary restrictions in the defense industry,
shortfalls seem to have become an accepted fact of the
aerospace industry life.
Perhaps the respondents recognize that joint program funding is tenuous at best. "Few joint programs
enjoy single-source funding ... funding is provided by
the services, subject to each service's assessment of its
own funding priorities" as is pointed out by the DSMC.

Funding

0

1
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(Ref.IS)

Finding 6:All programs suneyed were considered controversial.
Program Sensitivity

All respondents classified their programs as controversial: approximately 60% classified the program sensi·
tivity as "highly" controversial while the remaining 40%
were"somewhat"controversial.
The level of program sensitivity docs not appear to
correlate to findings I, 2, 3, and 4. Perhaps, as is the case
with finding S, th e pervasiveness of program sensitivity
docsnotactasadiscriminator.

Finding 7:The level of Lead Agency support varies consistently across programs from
"almost none" to the "highett level of
support."
Approximately 30"/o responded with "adequate" support being provided by the Lead Agency; 25% reported
"highest" support, and the remaining 25% reported
"lukewarm" support. Approximately 20% cited "almost
none."
The level of Lead Agency support docs not correlate to
Findings I, 2, 3, and 4. It appears that this docs not have a
noticcableimpactonhumanresourceissues.

..,.

During initial convergence activities, "every
policy and procedure is up for grabs." Mergers and acquisitions can cause depression, uncertainty, loss of
control and job insecurity. (Ref. 18) Experienced corporate observers csli.rnatc that it takes two to three years
for the ttawna of an acquisition or merger to subside. In
many cases, ~normaJcyM never returns. (Ref. 3)
Job characteristics and attitudes toward coworkers (peers and supervisors) are two primary
dctcnninants of overall employee attitudes towards
organizational commitment and satisfaction. (Ref. 18)
Employees need the following:

~

The findingsareclearthathumanresource issues
are perceived as problematic in the process of converging inter-agency government programs. High areas of

stress were determined to be in the areas of program
uncertainty, morale of the organization, bureaucratic
roadblocks, and direction provided by top-most levels of
management. All areas listed are widely recognized in
the literature for their negative impacts on the success
prospects of merging organizations. Only recently have

researchers begun to study the impact on employees, an
issue many argue is critical in determining the success
orfailurcofconvergence.(Ref.18)

l .cle1rperceplionthatsomeoneisinch1rge
2.~bcingmanagedin•forcefuluidfllirmanncr

Distance between functioning parts of the or-

) . open,honestwmmunicationsabouthowtheprocesswiUunfold
4. dear i;ommuniattion of 111)1 chuiges in the reward structure.

ganization was the subject of one ofthe questions in the
survey. Over 60% required air travel to see their coun1erpans. It could be said that distance does make the
convergence process a lot more difficult. It means
harder work is required on the communica1ions.

(Rd'll)

One highly successful organization actually
gathered employees together to hold a ceremony at
which they eulogized an old program they were phasing
out, and then offered a champagne toast to a new startup venture. (Ref.))
In conclusion, it has been suggested tha1 the
greatest sins of post-merger management are sins of
omission. In opting to do nothing in an cffon to avoid
doing something wrong, critical mistakes are made.
(Ref.17)
The reader should consider the limitations of this
survey lie in th e survey panicipant population. Funhcr
research is required to dctcnninc if expanding the ,small
sample size, and varying the government respondent
population would produce different results.

People problems arc cited as the reason why onchalf to two-thirds of organizational convergences ultimately fail. (Ref. 3) The combination of uncertainty about
program status, delayed pcnnancnt staffing, unconvcrged staffs, and lack of clear direction from top-level
management shown in this study affect people's morale
and productivity.
Stress reduction training helped employees cope
during the transition period of convergence. (Ref. 19)
Similarly, em ployees adjusted better to convergence and
decreased their uncertainty (insecurity) when they
received realistic communications throughout the
proccss.(Ref.14)(Ref.20)
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